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This is the sixth installment in MIT's
series of Jean Nicod Lectures, a series that is
based on the lectures delivered annually in
Paris by a leading philosopher of mind or
philosophically oriented cognitive scientist,
with past participants including Jerry Fodor,
Donald Davidson, John Searle, and Daniel
Dennett.  Millikan's lectures were presented
in 2002 and address the problem: "What are
the varieties of meaning? And what do they
have in common, so as to be treated together
under one cover?" (ix).  Millikan's answer,
briefly put, is that there are various forms of
meaning -- as is evidenced by the fact that
we say that James meant to harm his sister,
that a chainsaw is meant for cutting wood,
that the word 'evil' means 'wicked or highly
immoral', that black clouds mean rain, etc. --
and although there is no single thing that all
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these varieties of meaning have in common,
they cannot properly be understood without
grasping their many interconnections.   
I.  Purposes and Cross-Purposes
The book is divided into four parts,
the first of which consists of two chapters in
which Millikan concentrates on the notion of
'purpose'.  She begins (in Chapter 1:
"Purposes and Cross-Purposes of Humans")
by dismantling the commonsense view that a
principled distinction can be drawn between
'real' purposes and merely metaphorical
purposes (or between a person's purposes
and merely biological or natural purposes),
as when we say that a person's consciously
formed intention not to blink is a genuine
purpose, whereas the purpose of the
eye-blink reflex (to prevent foreign objects
from entering the eye) is a purpose only by
analogy or metaphorically.  Millikan argues,
instead, that consciously formed purposes
and biological purposes are on an equal
footing, and purposes of all kinds are entirely natural insofar as all "have their origin in
adaptation by some form of selection" (13).  Millikan then (in Chapter 2: "Purposes and
Cross-Purposes of Memes") turns to 'memes' (i.e., cultural artifacts that are reproduced by
imitation rather than genetically -- e.g., dress fashions, ideas, values, and forms of
expression), arguing that the underlying purpose or function of memes is to facilitate social
coordination.
II.  Natural Signs and Intentional Signs
The second part of the book begins with a discussion (in Chapter 3: "Local Natural
Signs and Information") of 'natural signs', signs which cannot be false or unsatisfied (unlike
'intentional signs', which can).  For example, red spots all over Tommy's face mean (or
naturally signify) that Tommy has the measles, but only if he does in fact have the measles. 
Natural signs, obviously, carry 'natural information', that is to say, information about a
segment of the natural world, and they do so -- in Millikan's view -- because in each case "it
is possible for a true belief to be reached about one thing [e.g., Tommy's health] from
knowledge of the other [e.g., red spots]…, where the truth of the belief reached will not be
accidental because the connection in thought correctly and nonaccidentally tracks a
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dependency in nature" (p.37).  For a correlation between As and Bs to be nonaccidental,
Millikan adds, there must be a reason why the correlation persists or replicates itself over
other domains of time and space.
Millikan then proceeds (in Chapter 4: "Productivity and Embedding in Natural
Signs") to discuss two features of natural signs: their productivity, that is, their capacity to
say new things or provide new information; and their embeddedness, that is, the capacity of
one natural sign to be embedded within another, as when tracks in the woods are a sign of
the presence of quail, while a photo of these tracks would be a sign of that sign of quail.  
The subject of discussion then turns from natural signs to intentional signs,
beginning with Chapter 5: "Teleosemantic Theories".  Millikan first points out that
intentionality (or how a representation could be of or about something) is not explained by a
teleological theory, which only aims to explain how representations can be false.  What
account, then, do teleological theories offer of misrepresentation?  According to such
theories, notes Millikan, "false representations are representations, yet they fail to
represent," just as "something can be a can opener but be too dull and hence fail to open
cans" (64).  The strategy here is to avoid the reification of special 'intentional objects': in
cases of false representation, the subject is not representing something that doesn't exist,
but rather fails to represent anything at all.  In short, Millikan's view is that "teleosemantic
theories are piggyback theories" (66).  In other words, such theories do not seek to provide
an account of intentional representation, but instead ride on some basic theory of
representation (e.g., a causal theory, an informational theory), to which is added: (i) the
teleologist's claim that for a representation to be an intentional representation it must be a
function or purpose of the system that produced it, and (ii) the teleosemanticist's account of
what a false representation is, given the underlying theory of representation.  "That is all
teleosemantics amounts to," writes Millikan (67).
Millikan, therefore, next considers (in Chapter 6: "Intentionality") what base theory
of the representing relation the teleologist could offer on which to build an account of
intentional representation.  In particular, she examines Dretske's proposal of placing natural
signs and the natural information they carry at the base of a theory of intentionality -- on
this proposal, natural signs whose function it is to carry natural information come to
represent intentionally, they become intentional representations.  But Millikan finds fault
with such a proposal, on the grounds that it wrongly assumes that the intentional
representation-producers have as their purpose to produce natural signs; rather, on
Millikan's view, "when they [intentional sign-producers] perform their functions by their
normal mechanisms they produce natural signs" (76).  Millikan then proceeds to outline her
theory of intentional representation, identifying in the process three kinds of intentional
representations: descriptive (which represent or describe what is the case), directive (which
represent or direct what is to be done), and pushmi-pullyu (which are both descriptive and
directive).
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Millikan closes Part II with a discussion (in Chapter 7) of intensionality, with
particular reference to intensional contexts.  Customarily, intensional contexts are described
as contexts in which coreferential expressions are not substitutable salva veritate.  Millikan,
however, holds that there is a more illuminating way of thinking about intensional contexts:
"The phenomenon here is not that one cannot substitute coreferential terms without change
of truth-value, but that the grammar alone does not prove that one can.  Whether one can or
not is a pragmatic matter" (95).
III.  Outer Intentional Signs
The underlying thesis of Part III is the claim that "conventional signs used for their
conventional purposes usually are read in exactly the same way that natural signs are read"
(109).  The opening chapter (Chapter 8: "Linguistic Signs Emerge from Natural Signs") kicks
off the project of highlighting the similarities between the two kinds of signs by outlining
how conventional language signs evolve from natural signs without losing their character of
being also natural signs.  This is followed by one of the more provocative parts of the book
(Chapter 9: "Direct Perception through Language), where Millikan advances the claim that
understanding language is at root another form of direct perception of the world.  She hopes
that this claim, when conjoined to the view that perception is a way of understanding natural
signs, will help support the view that understanding language is very much like
understanding natural signs. 
Millikan begins by rejecting the traditional notions of 'direct perception' (according
to which sense impressions are directly and infallibly represented by the mind) and 'indirect
perception' (according to which representations of the outer world are derived by the use of
inference).  She nevertheless retains the distinction between direct and indirect perception,
but reconceives it in terms of translation rather than inference, so that a representation of
the outer world that is derived by a series of fallible translations from one sign into another
counts as an indirect perception.  Millikan then proceeds to her central thesis, that "coming
to believe something by being told it is so, in the typical case, is the formation of a direct
perceptual belief" (120).  Suppose, for example, that I come to believe that my son, Johnny,
has just arrived home from school.  A number of factors may compel me to adopt this belief
-- e.g., I could simply observe Johnny coming through the door, or I could hear him shout,
"Dad, I'm home!", or I could hear my wife say to me, "Johnny's home".  On Millikan's view,
each of these ways of forming the belief, 'Johnny has arrived home', are equivalent in
directness of psychological processing.  This may or may not be the case -- I leave that for
psychologists to decide.  The problem, however, is whether 'perception through language'
(e.g., hearing what is going on in the world through the medium of other people's speech
transmission systems) can plausibly be assimilated to 'ordinary perception' (i.e., seeing
what is going on in the world through the medium of normally surrounding light).  For one
thing, the reliability of the latter form of perception is often greater than the reliability of the
Share
Welcome to MHN's unique
book review site
Metapsychology. We
feature over 5300 in-depth
reviews of a wide range of
books and DVDs written by
our reviewers from many
backgrounds and
perspectives. We update
our front page weekly and
add more than fifty new
reviews each month. Our
editor is Christian Perring,
PhD. To contact him, use
the form available here.
Can't remember our URL?
Access our reviews directly
via 'metapsychology.net'
Metapsychology Online
reviewers normally receive
gratis review copies of the
items they review.
Metapsychology Online
receives a commission
from Amazon.com for
purchases through this
site, which helps fund our
continuing growth. We
thank you for your support!
Join our e-mail list!:
Metapsychology New
Review - Varieties of Meaning - Philosophy http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=2516
4 of 6 24/02/2010 9:18 AM
former kind (though Millikan does try to meet this objection on pp.124-25).
In the following chapter (Chapter 10: "Tracking the Domains of Conventional
Signs") Millikan argues that, just as you can tell what you are seeing through a pair of
binoculars without thinking about what is inside the binoculars and why they work, so you
can tell what a speaker's words mean without thinking about the speaker's "insides" (his
mind or intentions) -- grasping the speaker's meaning only requires you to think the same
content that the speaker purposefully communicates.
The remaining chapters of Part III concentrate on different ways of drawing the
semantics-pragmatics distinction (with Millikan arguing that this distinction typically
supervenes upon another, and necessarily vague, distinction between conventional and
non-conventional uses of language) and on the semantics of indexicals, demonstratives, and
referential descriptions.  
IV.  Inner Intentional Signs
In the final section of the book Millikan looks at 'inner representations' and in
particular at the question of "how and why, during the evolution of perception and cognition,
organisms have acquired inner representations that are more sophisticated than pushmi-
pullyu signs" (157). 
Much of the opening chapter of this section (Chapter 13) is preoccupied with the
various features of pushmi-pullyu signs, or P-Ps, which represent facts and give directions or
represent goals, both at once.  Bee dances, for example, tell where the nectar is and at the
same time tell where the watching bees are to go.  Indeed, Millikan conjectures that all
intentional signals used between nonhuman animals are P-Ps.  One of the disadvantages,
however, of being a purely 'pushmi-pullyu animal' is that "such an animal does not
represent its goals in a format that enables it to know whether or when it has reached them"
(169).
Next (in Chapter 14: "Detaching Representations of Objects"), Millikan focuses on
the dorsal and ventral visual systems in order to show how the descriptive part of a P-P
(e.g., the ventral system, which detects what objects the animal confronts) may come apart
or be detached from the directive part of a P-P (e.g., the dorsal system, which directs the
movements of the animal).
After a brief discussion (in Chapter 15) of space and time -- where Millikan marshals
experimental support for the view that "just as many animals construct representations of
the spatial layouts in which they live, many construct representations of regularities in the
temporal layouts in which they live" (187) -- the subject turns to goal state representations. 
In Chapter 16 ("Detaching Goal State Representations"), Millikan argues that P-Ps can give
way to "a common system of mental representation…in which projected goal states,
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objectively represented future states, and objectively represented present states can all be
expressed" (197).  Millikan then investigates (in Chapter 17) how representations of
projected goal states are generated.
The last two, and very interesting, chapters delve into the ways in which the
representational capacities of humans differ from those of nonhuman animals.  In Chapter
18 ("Limitations on Nonhuman Thought"), Millikan observes that, unlike humans,
"[nonhuman] animals perceive the world only as a subject of practical concern, not as a
subject of theoretical judgment" (219).  This is evidenced by the fact that human, but not
nonhuman, animals collect facts and develop skills for which they have no practical uses
("we appear to be compulsive collectors of all kinds of representational junk" (215)). 
However, this ability to represent things far removed from practical activity requires a
distinct representational system that is unlike anything found in nonhuman animals.  In fact,
the kind of representational system that is required, argues Millikan in the final chapter, is
one which infuses a subject-predicate structure into representations, where the predicate is
sensitive to a negation transformation.  And so, Millikan conjectures, it is the development of
human language that has allowed for the development of theoretical thought.   
This, in brief, is a wide-ranging book, covering a diverse range of issues at the
intersection of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, but always bringing
the scientific literature in such fields as psychology and biology to bear on the issues at
hand.  Indeed, one of the great virtues of the book is that it regularly defers to and
illuminates recent experimental studies, as well as providing a rich array of examples,
images, and analogies drawn, in the main, from the world of biology.  Be warned, however,
that Millikan's (often compressed) writing style and thinking will be challenging to those not
familiar with her work or the current debates in teleosemantics.  Challenging, I say, but not
impenetrable -- and the rewards in insight repay the outlay in effort.
© 2005 Nick Trakakis
 
Nick Trakakis, Department of Philosophy, Monash
University, Australia.
About Us | About CenterSite | Terms & Privacy
Copyright © CenterSite, LLC, 1995-2010
Review - Varieties of Meaning - Philosophy http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=2516
6 of 6 24/02/2010 9:18 AM
